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SOME REALISM ABOUT CORPORATE
CRIME
JAMES D. NELSON*
I
INTRODUCTION
A lot can happen in twenty years. Since publication of the Holder Memo in
June of 1999,1 we have experienced recurring corporate misconduct, from the
accounting frauds at Enron and WorldCom, to the BP oil spill, to the Volkswagen
emissions scandal. At least in part due to ongoing frustration with such
misconduct, we have also seen multiple efforts by the Department of Justice to
update, tweak, clarify, or refine the U.S. government’s approach to the problem
of corporate crime.2 Last, but certainly not least for purposes of this Article, we
have seen the reemergence of interest among criminal law scholars in how to deal
with the “special nature” of the corporate person.3
The revival of interest in the nature of the corporate person has not been
limited to criminal law scholars. Indeed, at least when it comes to popular
perception, the issue of corporate personhood in criminal law has been of
secondary importance. In 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided
Citizens United v. FEC,4 which held that the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects the right of corporations to spend unlimited amounts
of money on politics.5 And in 2014, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.,6 holding for the first time that for-profit corporations are
eligible to claim religious exemptions from general laws.7 Together, Citizens
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1. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and
U.S. Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder
Memo on Prosecuting Corporations], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/
2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/2YNX-KBW5].
2. See Resources, CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporateprosecution-registry/browse/resources.html [https://perma.cc/KH3H-3MAD] (featuring links to
Department of Justice documents related to federal corporate prosecution guidelines).
3. The Holder Memo uses this phrase at the end of its section entitled “Charging Corporations—
Factors to be Considered.” See Holder Memo on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 1.
4. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5. Id. at 365–66.
6. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
7. Id. at 692.
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United and Hobby Lobby have begotten a revival of historical debates about
what rights the corporate person should enjoy.8
In these debates, there appears to be a widely shared intuition that issues of
corporate personality in criminal law, on the one hand, and in constitutional law,
on the other, are closely related.9 Both involve questions about the moral status
of corporations and how the law should treat them in light of that status. And yet
the possibilities for intellectual arbitrage between the two fields have not been
fully exploited. This Article seeks to take a step in that direction.
More specifically, this Article aims to distill some lessons from those who
have adopted and advanced a realist approach to questions of corporate rights.10
Following critiques of corporate theory in the early decades of the twentieth
century, especially the powerful arguments offered by John Dewey, the realist
approach to rights seeks to bracket—or at least to deflate—the intractable
debates about the corporation’s metaphysical status. In their place, realists about
corporate rights have urged that we take a pragmatic approach that focuses on
the “concrete facts and relations” that should guide the law’s treatment of
corporations.11
In the remainder of this Article, I will try to synthesize four lessons from
realists about corporate rights and suggest how they might be leveraged by
scholars of corporate crime. Part II is about the needless invocation of abstract
concepts in reasoning about corporate entitlements. This lesson is likely most
familiar to scholars of corporate crime, but the persistence of conceptualism

8. The literature in this area is vast. A search of Westlaw’s Law Reviews & Journals database for
“corporate personhood,” for instance, returned 797 results since 2010. Search Results for “Corporate
Personhood” since 2010, Secondary Sources – Law Reviews & Journals, WESTLAW,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default%
29 (select “Secondary Sources” from the drop-down menu in the main search bar; type “corporate
personhood” into the search bar and press enter; set date range from “01/01/2010”). An identical search
in Google Scholar returned 3,640 results since 2010. Search Results for “Corporate Personhood” since
2010, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/ (type “corporate personhood” into the search bar
and press enter; then set custom date range from 2010 to 2020).
9. See, e.g., N. Craig Smith, Introduction: The Moral Responsibility of Firms: Renewed Interest in a
Perennial Question of Business Ethics, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 1, 2 (Eric W. Orts &
N. Craig Smith eds., 2017) (“Recent court cases in the USA, that seem to give corporations rights of
religious expression and freedom of speech normally reserved for individual human beings, also heighten
the importance of [corporate blame, punishment, and deterrence] questions.”); Eric W. Orts, Conclusion:
The Moral Responsibility of Firms: Past, Present, and Future, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS,
supra, at 206, 214 (discussing “[t]he recent high-profile US Supreme Court case of Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014), which recognized a right of some family-owned firms to resist legal obligations
on religious grounds”).
10. See, e.g., Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism about Corporate Rights, in
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 345 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoe
Robinson eds., 2016); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565 (2013);
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH. L. REV. 1629 (2011). Although the
legacy of legal realism is contested, this Article focuses on realist arguments that have appeared in the
corporate rights literature, especially those made by scholars following John Dewey.
11. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673
(1926).
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about the corporate person recommends at least a brief rehearsal of the main
lines of argument.
Part III addresses the related, though importantly distinct, question regarding
what should replace conceptualism about corporations once the realist critique is
absorbed. In other words, the realists were—and are—especially good at
destruction of airy theoretical concepts, but they are not typically known for their
constructive suggestions. Is there any positive program that results from the
realist critique? This Part suggests that there is, at least in the sense of outlining
an appropriate methodology to answer questions about corporate entitlements.
Part IV then engages the most overtly critical aspect of the realist tradition,
namely, the idea that abstract concepts are not only indeterminate, but also serve
as vehicles in which parties to a particular “struggle” smuggle their ideological or
political priors.12 The argument in this Part focuses on the ways in which
conceptualism about corporate personality has led to cooptation by powerful
business interests, and how continuing to propound such conceptualism only
invites further appropriation.
Finally, Part V addresses the ultimate realist question: What are we supposed
to do about corporate crime? It does not attempt to provide a solution by
prescribing a particular course of reform. Instead, it offers something more in the
way of a modest caution against proposals that would seek to radically restructure
the corporation. Considering the failures of corporate criminal law over the last
twenty years, the impulse to seek such radical reforms is understandable. But, in
the realist spirit, I argue that we ought to have a practical accounting of likely
costs and benefits before we abandon core features of the corporate form.
II
REALISM ABOUT PERSONHOOD
In the corporate rights literature, Citizens United rekindled interest in
theories of corporate personality.13 The case involved a constitutional challenge
to a federal law prohibiting corporations from spending treasury money on
certain kinds of political communications.14 The opinion itself was largely
agnostic on deep questions of corporate personhood, resting much of its weight
on the argument that the First Amendment protects listeners’ right to hear
messages conveyed by corporations.15 This approach, moreover, aligned with the
12. See id. at 665.
13. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 999
(2010).
14. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010) (describing the provision of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act that prohibited corporations and unions from using treasury funds for
“electioneering communications”).
15. See id. at 336–66; see also id. at 465 n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in this analysis turns
on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and
implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized model. . . . It is not
necessary to agree on a precise theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural
persons in fundamental ways, and that a legislature might therefore need to regulate them differently if
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Court’s longstanding preference for focusing on the constitutional interests of
individuals rather than on the nature of the corporation.16 Nevertheless, in
scholarly as well as popular conversations, Citizens United functioned as an open
invitation to revisit debates about corporate personality.
Those debates were once prominent in the legal and philosophical literature.
They typically involved controversies about whether the corporation was a
concession of state power, an aggregation of individual stockholders, or a real
entity with its own independent standing in the political community.17 But these
debates were intractable and interminable—the discourse about corporate
personality seemed as fruitless as it was “endless.”18 And although it took at least
a few years to sink in, the conventional historical view is that John Dewey’s
intervention was a “stunning eulogy” that put these debates to rest for decades
to come.19
In his analysis of the ongoing debates, Dewey took pains to show that theories
of corporate personality are indeterminate.20 These theories, he argued, could
just as easily be invoked by one side of any controversy as by the other. This
flexibility—or flippability—was due to the fact that abstract theories about the
nature of corporations do not contain normative premises to evaluate corporate
treatment. To be sure, Dewey was attentive to the possibility—indeed, the
likelihood—that such theories could be deployed effectively by those who argued
for certain policy positions. In that way, they might be thought to have some
argumentative “tilt.”21 But on Dewey’s account, the theories themselves do not
have any independent normative purchase. Theories of corporate personhood, in
other words, do not provide reasons for supporting one side or the other. Those
reasons must come from elsewhere, and the various theories were simply
conceptual vehicles in which to smuggle one’s policy preferences.22
Drawing on Dewey’s insights, contemporary corporate rights scholars have
urged that we avoid reviving moribund questions about corporate personhood.23
Those theories, as Dewey showed, are not helpful in determining how the law
should treat corporations or in determining what kinds of entitlements they
should have. On this view, it is best to skip—or to bracket—deep metaphysical
it is human welfare that is the object of its concern.”) (internal citations omitted); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 155–58 (2010) (arguing that both the
majority and the dissent in Citizens United emphasized listeners’ interests).
16. See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015).
17. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 201 (1990).
18. See Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932).
19. Mark, supra note 17, at 1480.
20. See Nelson, supra note 10, at 1572–74 (discussing Dewey’s indeterminacy critique).
21. For an argument along these lines, see Horwitz, supra note 17, at 175–76.
22. See Nelson, supra note 10, at 1573.
23. See sources cited supra note 10.
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questions about corporate personality and to get right to the pragmatic task of
evaluating the concrete social facts and relations that obtain in the real world.
Much as in the corporate rights literature, questions about corporate
personhood have enjoyed a similar revival among those concerned with the
problem of corporate crime.24 The bulk of this revival revolves around the
question whether corporations are moral agents.25 For proponents of moral
agency, the basic argument typically goes something like the following.
Corporations are capable of recognizing and conforming their behavior to a set
of morally relevant obligations. Given this capacity to respond to moral
reasons—that is, to function in the space of obligations—corporations are
“conversable” agents. And in virtue of this status as conversable agents, we are
then justified in thinking of corporations as “persons.”26
This functional personhood, in turn, is said to make corporations suitable for
certain responsibilities.27 Since they can respond to moral obligations, that is, it
makes sense to impose those moral obligations upon them. And since the
criminal law is one important means of enforcing moral obligations, corporations
are fit to be held criminally responsible.28 To put these points together succinctly,
characterizing corporations as persons makes it appropriate to subject them to
certain liabilities, including criminal liabilities.29
To be sure, this schematic argument has not gone without vigorous challenge.
Some commentators contend that corporate moral agency is an illusion or, at
best, a metaphor standing in for the real behavior of human beings.30 Others resist
24. See Mihailis E. Diamantis & William S. Laufer, Prosecution and Punishment of Corporate
Criminality, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 453, 455–56 (2019) (discussing recent literature).
25. See, e.g., THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9.
26. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 174–78 (2011); see also Philip Pettit, The Conversable, Responsible
Corporation, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at 15, 23 (“That corporations and
other such bodies are conversable agents means, in quasi-legal parlance, that they are persons.”).
27. See Pettit, supra note 26, at 32.
28. Pettit is perhaps more cautious in this final conclusion, though he does say, “I believe that their
fitness to be held responsible . . . argues for the appropriateness of holding corporations responsible in
the criminal law.” Id. at 33. Other scholars who follow his basic argument about functional or “pragmatic”
personhood, however, have been more decisive in concluding that corporations should be held criminally
responsible. See, e.g., W. Robert Thomas, How and Why Corporations Became (and Remain) Persons
Under the Criminal Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479, 504 (2018) (“I disagree that legal personhood is
insufficient to give rise to criminal liability. What it means to be a legal person is to be able to participate
in the space of legal rights and obligations, which includes being held responsible for violating these
obligations. One paradigmatic feature of that space is criminal law and punishment.”).
29. See John Hasnas, The Phantom Menace of the Responsibility Deficit, in, THE MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at 89, 98 (“[T]he reason why the corporate moral responsibility
debate is such a lively one is that most of the advocates of corporate moral responsibility believe that it
is important to be able to impose punishment on corporations as collective entities, and they recognize
that moral responsibility is necessary for such punishment.”); see also id. (“A just legal system imposes
criminal sanctions only on morally responsible agents. Therefore, moral responsibility is (or should be)
a prerequisite for criminal punishment.”).
30. See David Ronnegard & Manuel Velasquez, On (Not) Attributing Moral Responsibility to
Organizations, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at 123, 139 (criticizing
“collectivist” accounts of corporate moral agency).
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the argument from personhood on the grounds that corporate criminal liability
imposes vicarious punishment on innocent stakeholders.31 These skeptical
accounts, however, seem to share the basic assumption that some form of
personhood is necessary to justify corporate criminal liability.32 These skeptics
may contest the idea that corporations are persons, but they seem to concede that
this “threshold question” has significant implications for how the law should treat
them.33
It is at this point that the realist’s “cynical acid” might be most useful.34 In
recent years, realists about corporate rights have reminded us that one need not
answer metaphysical questions about the corporation’s status to determine how
they should be treated.35 Descriptions of the nature of the corporation do not
produce the normative premises necessary to make arguments about corporate
entitlements. Those premises can only come from an investigation of the values
and interests that we care about as a political community—that is, from our
political morality.36 Those underlying principles of political morality will then
drive our conclusions about whether and how the law—including the criminal
law—might be deployed to vindicate our values.

31. See Hasnas, supra note 29, at 97–102.
32. See id. at 99; see also Ronnegard & Velasquez, supra note 30, at 140 (arguing that moral agency
is “necessary for moral responsibility”).
33. See Diamantis & Laufer, supra note 24, at 455 (discussing the “threshold questions of agency”);
see also DAVID RONNEGARD, THE FALLACY OF CORPORATE MORAL AGENCY 5 (2015) (arguing that
conclusions about the moral agency of corporations have “important wider ramifications”); Thomas
Donaldson, Preface to THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at v (“[T]he arcane,
abstract issue of moral agency has weighty practical consequences . . . .”).
34. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). The
basic realist point—that claims about corporate personhood are not necessary to make determinations
about how corporations should be treated—is not entirely absent from the criminal law literature.
Indeed, Steven Walt and William Laufer made a version of this argument nearly three decades ago. Why
Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263 (1991).
In their article, they defended the claim that “imposition of corporate criminal liability does not require
references to persons or features peculiar to individuals.” Id. at 264. Although their arguments rested on
the logical relationship (or lack thereof) between ontological status and normative conclusions rather
than on appeals to pragmatism, their conclusions are consistent with those reached by the realists. Their
article is cited often in debates over the moral status of firms, but its important lessons typically go
unheeded.
35. See sources cited supra note 10. At first glance, it would appear that John Hasnas has argued
along similar lines. Indeed, Hasnas invoked another famous legal realist—Felix Cohen—to argue that
theories of corporate personality are “transcendental nonsense.” See John Hasnas, Where is Felix Cohen
When We Need Him?: Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 19 J.L. &
POL’Y 55, 58 (2010). But Hasnas goes on to make a stronger ontological claim when he insists that the
corporation is “not a thing,” and then infers from that idea a further normative claim that we should not
recognize corporate criminal liability. See id. at 69. This method of reasoning, however, runs contrary to
the realist account I rehearse above. On that account, the corporation may or may not be “a thing”—that
is a deep and difficult question of metaphysics that we are not yet in a position to resolve confidently.
But regardless of how—or whether—we resolve that question, we can still make normative claims about
how corporations should be treated by the criminal law based on the interests and values we identify as
important to our political morality. The question of corporate personhood, that is, can simply drop out
of the analysis.
36. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 368.

05 - NELSON - SOME REALISM ABOUT CORPORATE CRIME (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2020]

SOME REALISM ABOUT CORPORATE CRIME

1/14/2021 12:39 PM

119

A defender of corporate personhood might respond in the following way. For
the criminal law to work—that is, to achieve its goals, whatever they may be—we
need to know that the corporation is the kind of thing that can respond to its
injunctions. On this view, if the corporation is not a moral agent in the sense that
it can function in the space of obligations, then it makes no sense to subject it to
criminal sanctions.
It may be true that you need to make some claims about the nature of
groups—what they are and how they function—to explain complex social
behavior. This is a question about the best theory of social scientific description,
and for this question, it is quite possible that methodological individualism is
mistaken. But explanations of corporate behavior do not provide justifications
for how corporations should be treated. That is, social scientific descriptions of
how corporations function do not provide reasons for treating them one way or
another. Those reasons can only come from moral and political theory. And it is
perfectly plausible to say that, as a matter of moral and political theory, we should
punish corporations (or not punish them, as the case may be) regardless of
whether they count as persons.37
In short, following renewed interest in corporate personhood after Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby, realists about corporate rights have reminded us of
Dewey’s admonition to focus on the facts and interests at play rather than on
whether the corporation counts as a person. The problem of corporate
personhood may present intriguing metaphysical questions, but, lucky for us, we
need not wait until those questions are resolved to decide how the law should
proceed. Instead, deep disagreements about corporate status can simply be put
to the side as we deliberate about what to do with corporations. These insights
would seem to apply just as forcefully in the context of designing and
implementing corporate criminal law as they do in the context of corporate rights.
III
REALISM ABOUT CORPORATIONS
Realism has always been particularly good at telling us what not to do. We
shouldn’t treat the law as if it were a matter of deductive logic. We shouldn’t reify
concepts. And we shouldn’t pretend that those who use those concepts are doing
so in a neutral way, without political or ideological motivation. But realism’s
track record with regard to defining a positive program is more checkered. In
other words, the realists were particularly good at destruction, not always so great
at construction.38
37. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Denying Corporate Rights and Punishing Corporate Wrongs, 25 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 517, 527 (2015) (“[W]e might have good reasons to hold corporations responsible for their
wrongs even if they do not satisfy the criteria for moral agency.”); see also Steven Walt & Micah
Schwartzman, Morality, Ontology, and Corporate Rights, 11 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2017) (arguing
that corporate personhood is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine corporate entitlements).
38. See Nelson, supra note 10, at 1575; see also BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT
ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 210 (1998)
(arguing that Robert Hale’s “skeptical, deconstructive analysis offered little guidance” on questions of
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Does realism about personhood offer any kind of positive program? This Part
argues that it does, or at least that it points us in the right direction as a matter of
methodology. The critical strand of realism is well known. Conceptualism about
law—or about many other things, including morality—is unhelpful, and so we
should ditch it. But there is another strand of the realist program that seems to
tell us more about what we should do after we ditch conceptualism. That strand
of realism, following Dewey again, tells us that we ought to focus on the facts of
real life. In other words, we should take a social scientific approach to the law,
bringing an empirical spirit to understanding, and eventually solving, the
problems that we face.39
At first glance, however, it is hard to see how social science fits within the
realist program described in Part II. That is, if we are supposed to start with the
values and interests that we care about as a matter of political morality, rather
than on conceptions of the person, then where do the “facts” on the ground come
in?
Once again, it seems that realists about corporate rights have provided a
helpful roadmap. According to this roadmap, deciding how corporations should
be treated—that is, deciding what entitlements they should have—involves two
distinct steps. First, we have to determine what values and interests we are trying
to protect or promote. This is the normative question, to be answered as a matter
of political morality.
Once we answer this first question, we then ask: How do those values and
interests play out in different kinds of organizations, including in corporations?
And here is where social science becomes critically important. To determine how
the law might promote certain values and interests, it turns out that we need to
know a lot about how different organizations and institutions function. And when
it comes to determining whether corporations will promote the values and
interests that we have identified as a matter of political morality, we need to dig
into the institutional details of firms and markets to understand how they work.40
Sometimes the realist program is misunderstood as being anti-theoretical.
But the realists about corporate rights have been careful to show that this is not
the case. The first step of determining corporate entitlements is still a theoretical
policy); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
409, 427–28 (2020) (discussing Fried’s analysis of Hale).
39. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1240–59 (1985); see
also Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 639 (2007) (discussing
“the association between legal realism and the mobilization of social sciences for the purposes of legal
discourse”). For an account of the realist legacy that focuses on naturalism and pragmatism, see Brian
Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 312 (1997)
(“The Realists give us the philosophical motivation and cues for how we should proceed, even if they do
not carry off the project themselves.”). As Leiter points out, Dewey’s pragmatism was closely related to
his naturalism. See id. at 315 n.206. For an excellent historical overview of the connection between legal
realism and scientific naturalism, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74–94 (1973).
40. See Nelson, supra note 10, at 1573–74; Pollman, supra note 10, at 1670–75; Schragger &
Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 368–69.
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one—what are the values and interests that we care about and want to promote
as a political community? It’s just that the theory involved at this first step is
moral and political theory, not metaphysics.
This first step, moreover, is indispensable—we cannot simply skip over it and
‘get right to the facts.’ And that’s because, as in any area of social scientific
inquiry, there are an infinite number of facts in the world waiting to be
discovered. That is, there is an infinite mound of data waiting for the social
scientist to collect and to investigate. To determine which facts matter—which
facts are worth collecting and investigating—we need to have a theory of
relevance. We need to have a theory to identify the questions we are trying to
answer, which then tells us what kinds of data would help answer those questions.
For questions of corporate entitlements, that theory comes from our political
morality, not from corporate metaphysics.41 Or, as Dewey might put it, we need
to focus on “interests,” not on “beings.”42
Fortunately, in the literature on corporate rights, we have some exemplars of
this realist-inspired methodology. To begin with, some scholars have recently
brought considerable quantitative expertise to the study of corporate rights,
particularly in the free speech area.43 Others have focused on the historical
development of corporations, and in particular the rise of the modern, widely
held public company.44 Still others have highlighted the degree to which
developments in modern capital markets have come to confound many of the

41. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 360; see also Walt & Schwartzman, supra note
37, at 14 (“moral theory determines the moral significance of facts about corporations with which the
theory must be consistent.”); Waheed Hussain & Joakim Sandberg, Pluralistic Functionalism about
Corporate Agency, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 9, at 66, 69 (“when it comes
to the important social, moral, and political questions that surround business corporations in
contemporary liberal democracies, [the] metaphysical or pre-institutional sense of collective agency is
largely irrelevant.”). For more general statements of this realist methodology, see Hanoch Dagan,
Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2015)
(“[Realists] realize that value judgments are indispensable not only when evaluating empirical research,
but also when simply choosing the facts to be investigated.”); Dagan, supra note 39, at 649 (“A
prescription for sensitivity to situations and facts is vacuous without general normative commitments.”);
see also Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
849 (1935) (“The collection of social facts without a selective criterion of human values produces horrid
wilderness of useless statistics.”); id. (“Legal description is blind without the guiding light of a theory of
values.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222, 1236 (1931) (“[V]alue judgments must always be appealed to in order to set objectives for
[empirical] inquiry.”).
42. Dewey, supra note 11, at 662.
43. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Jackson, Shining Light]; Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 117 (2010);
see also John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015). For the argument that economic analysis of law “is reasonably
understood as a continuation of the Realist program,” see BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
1, 81–102 (2007).
44. See Pollman, supra note 10, at 1674 (arguing that we must “[take] account of the corporate
context and the dynamics of people underlying corporations”).
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traditional assumptions that lawyers and judges make about corporations.45 All
of these accounts draw heavily on social science; none of them turns on the nature
of the corporate person.
Realists about corporate rights have also shown the importance of
appreciating the diversity of our institutional landscape, including vast
differences among different kinds of corporations.46 Once again, this realism
follows Dewey, who saw how concepts like corporate personhood had a tendency
to flatten the normative universe by yoking together groups that have very
different social functions.47 Some of the realists about corporate rights have
focused on the differences between publicly held and privately held
corporations.48 Others have instead highlighted contrasts between for-profit and
nonprofit organizations.49 At a time when the instinct to flatten the organizational
universe is strong,50 and the law has become more receptive to that instinct,51 we
should not lose sight of deep organizational diversity in the real world.52
Understanding the many grooves and contours of the organizational landscape,
in turn, can point us toward a better understanding of which kinds of institutions
and organizations are good at promoting which kinds of interests. Just as
importantly, remaining sensitive to the division of institutional labor in society
can help us determine which kinds of organizations are not well suited to advance
those social interests.53

45. See Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How
and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299 (2012); Leo E. Strine,
Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law
Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 390 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a
Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L.
71 (2015).
46. See Pollman, supra note 10; Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV.
27, 63–84 (2014) [hereinafter Pollman, Privacy].
47. See Dewey, supra note 11, at 671.
48. See Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate
Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009); Pollman, Privacy, supra note 46, at 62–84.
49. See James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461 (2015).
50. See, e.g., Patricia Bromley & John W. Meyer, “They are All Organizations”: The Cultural Roots
of Blurring Between the Nonprofit, Business, and Government Sectors, 49 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 939 (2017);
see also M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009) (arguing against tax law distinction between nonprofits and for-profits that
perform charitable work).
51. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363–64 (2010) (rejecting the relevance of speaker
identity for purposes of free speech rights); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710–18
(2014) (rejecting the proposed line between for-profits and nonprofits for purposes of claiming religious
liberty rights). But see Nelson, supra note 49 (defending the for-profit/nonprofit distinction in freedom
of association law).
52. See Pollman, supra note 10, at 1631 (arguing that we need to be attentive to “the realities and
dynamics of the modern business corporation”).
53. For an argument that for-profit corporations are not well-suited to promote interests of
conscience, see Nelson, supra note 10. For a discussion of the “institutional division of moral labor,” see
JOSEPH HEALTH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM: THE MARKET FAILURES APPROACH TO
BUSINESS ETHICS 94 (2014).
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At this point, a critic might argue that deep disagreement about criminal law’s
core values poses a problem for translating the realist’s two-step methodology.
On this view, any attempt to apply the methodological lessons from realists about
rights would get stuck at step one, where questions about the interests we are
seeking to promote through the criminal law are deeply contested. If we cannot
decide whether the criminal law is best justified in terms of consequentialist,
deontological, expressivist, or other values, the critic might say, then how are we
supposed to know which facts are relevant at step two?
But criminal law’s value multiplicity is nothing new for the realist
methodology.54 To see why, consider that realists about corporate rights have
made many of their arguments in the context of controversies over free speech.
The normative grounding of free speech rights, in turn, is at least as contested as
that of the criminal law. First Amendment scholars have argued that free speech
promotes, among other things, the values of democratic self-government,55
checking abuses of power,56 promoting toleration,57 and protecting individual
freedom of thought.58 The realist method, however, is robust to these varied
normative interests—that is, it can be applied fruitfully regardless of the
particular value or combination of values we endorse. To be sure, realists about
corporate speech rights have to answer a contested question at step one, namely,
what is the best account of the interests served by the freedom of speech? And
just as surely, there is bound to be disagreement among reasonable people about
the normative weight or priority assigned to each value. But it is important to
keep in mind that the terrain of this contest is political morality, not the nature
of the corporation.
The same methodology should apply, mutatis mutandis, to the problem of
corporate crime. On the first step, we might have serious disagreements about
criminal law’s normative foundations. But that fight should happen on the terrain
of political morality, not in the realm of metaphysical concepts. And once a
reasonable ordering of criminal law’s political values is specified, then it is time
to draw on the best social science available to help us understand the way those
values can be promoted in the modern corporate world.
Indeed, the corporate crime literature already has its own exemplars of such
a realist approach that jettisons conceptualism in favor of a hard-nosed look at

54. For a pluralistic account of criminal punishment, see Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism,
in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 25 (Mark D. White ed., 2010).
55. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011);
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
56. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 523.
57. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
58. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 283 (2011).
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the facts and relations on the ground.59 This work shows how fruitful it can be to
bypass thorny conceptual questions about corporate personality and to take a
pragmatic pass at the social problems involved in corporate crime. Given the
warm reception these realist accounts have received,60 then, perhaps it is those
who work on corporate rights who need most reminding of this second realist
lesson.
IV
REALISM ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY
Now back to the critical strand of realism. In Part II of this Article, I argued
that the realists showed us that it is not necessary to answer questions about
corporate personhood to decide how corporations should be treated. In the
literature on corporate rights, this realist point means that when we try to
determine whether corporations should be eligible to claim certain entitlements,
we need not make any kind of determination about corporate personality. I then
suggested that, given the recent revival of similar questions in the corporate crime
literature, scholars working in this area would do well to take a page from the
realists about corporate rights and avoid unnecessary questions about the nature
of corporations.
The advice to avoid unnecessary questions, however, might take a weak form
and a strong form. The weak form would hold that, since questions about
corporate personality are unnecessary, we would be best advised to skip those
questions and move on. In other words, we should simply bracket the deep
questions that are being asked by the corporate metaphysicians, given that they
are not likely to be resolved anytime soon and that we are able to go forward and
function without answering them. Perhaps this is what Dewey had in mind when,
at the end of his famous essay, he said that if we focus on facts and relations,
retaining the word person will “do no great harm.”61
This Part, however, focuses on the stronger form of the critical argument. It
is one thing to claim that theories of corporate personality are indeterminate, and
therefore they are not helpful in solving our real social problems. But the realists
did not stop there. Instead, they were very attentive to the ways in which
indeterminate concepts can be used as ideological weapons, to be deployed
according to the “interest and purpose of a writer.”62 Indeed, Dewey was
59. For an especially good example, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014).
60. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, How Should Prosecutors Punish Corporate Criminals?, NEW
RAMBLER REV. (June 24, 2015), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/how-shouldprosecutors-punish-corporate-criminals [https://perma.cc/352P-YJUW] (reviewing GARRETT, supra
note 59); Jed S. Rakoff, Justice Deferred is Justice Denied, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 19, 2015), https://wwwnybooks-com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/articles/2015/02/19/justice-deferred-justice-denied/ [https://perma.cc/
RB2N-X9SZ] (same).
61. Dewey, supra note 11, at 673.
62. Id.; see also Dagan, supra note 39, at 633 (“[R]ealists typically approach their normative inquiries
in a critical and pluralistic spirit.”).
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particularly attuned to the ease with which various theories of corporate
personhood are flipped to support different ideological or political goals.63 The
theories of personhood, on this account, are not merely inert or idle distractions.
They are the tools used by “some party to a struggle” to rationalize their own
claims of power.64
In the field of corporate crime, it is not hard to see how discourse about the
moral agency of firms might be flipped to suit the interests of the powerful. The
primary goal of those seeking to establish corporate personhood is to close the
‘responsibility gap.’65 The idea here is that if we can demonstrate that
corporations are moral agents, then we can show that they are “fit” to be held
responsible by the criminal law. And if we can show that they are fit to be held
responsible by the criminal law, then we will have some way to make up for the
fact that it can be hard to pin responsibility on any particular individual when
complex organizations misbehave. When we cannot hold individuals responsible
under the criminal law—and perhaps even when we can—the corporation can be
a target for our residual store of blame.
But if we embrace the idea that corporations are moral agents, fit to be held
responsible by the criminal law, we can easily anticipate how businesses will try
to flip the argument. For example, if corporations are moral agents that are
proper subjects for a host of responsibilities, then businesses are likely to argue
that such moral agency should entitle them to certain claims of dignity and moral
rights. To put the point another way, if we use the language of personhood to
bolster corporate responsibility, what’s to stop businesses from using those same
arguments to fend off the harsh sanctions of criminal law?66
Indeed, in other areas of the law, we have already seen a similar dynamic play
out. For decades, scholars and advocates promoted the idea of “corporate social
responsibility” as a way to tame corporations, particularly those that were
operating in weak legal environments.67 The basic idea was that if corporations
could be moralized, then maybe we could avoid some of the abuses of corporate
power to which we had all become accustomed. But a funny thing happened on
the way to taming corporations. In recent years, more and more businesses have

63. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 358.
64. Dewey, supra note 11, at 665; see also John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.
REV. 17, 26 (1924) (observing that “the slogans of the liberalism of one period often become the bulwarks
of reaction in a subsequent era”) [hereinafter Dewey, Logical Method].
65. See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 26, at 33 (discussing the “shortfall in the regulatory effects that our
responsibility practices are generally designed to achieve”); Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated,
117 ETHICS 171, 194–97 (2007) (discussing the “deficit in the accounting books” that results when only
individuals are punished for corporate behavior). For discussion of the “responsibility gap” more
generally, see Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 471
(2018).
66. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 22–24 (2010) (discussing
moral reasons for criminal law’s special substantive, procedural, and evidentiary constraints).
67. For an excellent historical overview, see C. A. Harwell Wells, Cycles of Corporate Social
Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
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come to deploy the language of corporate social responsibility not to hold
themselves to a higher standard, but instead to avoid legal regulation.68
To take one recent example, in the litigation leading up to Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, businesses invoked the idea of corporate social responsibility to avoid
legal requirements to provide their employees with health insurance that covers
contraceptives.69 The basic structure of the claim went as follows. If businesses
can have moral responsibilities, as proponents of corporate social responsibility
had long claimed, then they could also have moral rights to exemptions from laws
with which they disagree.70 And perhaps not surprisingly, these arguments proved
successful in the Supreme Court. In his majority opinion, for example, Justice
Alito observed that if corporations can pursue various socially responsible
objectives, then “there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious
objectives as well.”71 This reasoning, in turn, cleared the way for the Court’s
ultimate conclusion that for-profit companies can claim religious exemptions
from general laws.72
This dynamic of co-optation has a long pedigree. Dating back to the Lochner
era, we saw businesses effectively co-opt the liberal principle of freedom of
contract and re-direct it to protect their own interests in avoiding commercial
regulations.73 More recently, we have observed a very similar dynamic, in which
businesses have flipped the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment
from a shield for minority and dissenting voices to a tool for aggrandizing
corporate power.74 In the life of the law, there has been little to stop powerful

68. See James D. Nelson & Elizabeth Sepper, Converting Corporate Social Responsibility
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
69. For a favorable review of these arguments, see Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There
Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59 (2013).
70. For other examples of this argumentative strategy, see Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case
for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 780 (2015) (“Corporations may be used to pursue moral goals
that aim to make the world a better place—an idea that resonates with the (generally left-of-center)
corporate social responsibility movement. Where such goals are rooted in religious principles, a
corporation may, and should, be able to invoke RFRA protections.”); Dylan Scott & Sarah Kliff, Leaked
Regulation: Trump Plans to Roll Back Obamacare Birth Control Mandate, VOX (May 31, 2017), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/31/15716778/trump-birth-control-regulation [https://perma.cc/
FH6G-5BAH] (discussing leaked draft of proposed Department of Health and Human Services rule,
which stated: “Businesses large and small take positions on matters of social justice, community benefit,
and ethical concerns beyond profit . . . . [T]herefore, the Departments consider it appropriate to exempt
any entity possessing religious beliefs or moral convictions against the coverage required by the Mandate,
regardless of its corporate structure or ownership interests.”).
71. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 712 (2014).
72. Id. at 719.
73. See J. M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383–84 (1990).
74. See id. at 384–85; Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment
Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone, eds., 2002); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1199 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016).
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forces from appropriating the arguments of their critics and turning them toward
their own purposes.
One might object at this point that there is a principled distinction between
holding corporations responsible and granting them various moral and legal
rights.75 A proponent of this objection might argue that the same set of moral and
political values that supports holding corporations responsible for the harms they
cause does not entail rights claims that augment corporate power.76 Or, in the
alternative, one might distinguish the moral agency of firms, which makes them
responsive to certain obligations, and the dignity of individual persons, which
makes them eligible for criminal law’s special constraints and protections.77
Both of these arguments are logically sound. But as Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. famously observed, “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”78 Perfectly fine logical distinctions—such as those between rights
and responsibilities or between agency and dignity—often crumble in the face of
politics and power. And if there is one thing that our experience with expanding
corporate rights has taught us, we should think twice before we doubt the power
of businesses to use any arguments at their disposal to promote their own
interests.79
V
REALISM ABOUT REFORM
Reflecting on the last twenty years, it is hard not to despair over the prospects
for reform of corporate criminal law. The standard approaches to the problem of
corporate crime, including the increasingly technocratic focus on optimal
deterrence and the design and refinement of intricate compliance programs, have
come to seem insufficient. Frustrated by the failure of these standard approaches,
some commentators have begun to entertain more drastic measures. Although
these measures differ in their details, they are united around the common belief
that there is something rotten with the corporation itself. If we are ever to make
any real progress toward eradicating corporate crime, on this view, we need to
stop looking at problems with particular corporations and start looking at
problems with the corporation.80
75. See Walt & Laufer, supra note 34, at 274.
76. See id.; see also LIST & PETTIT, supra note 26, at 175–85 (arguing that group agency justifies
special responsibilities but not special rights).
77. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 66, at 44.
78. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
79. See generally KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA
INVENTED CHRISTIAN AMERICA (2015); ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018).
80. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, supra note 65, at 490 (“The problem is the firm.”); SAMUEL W.
BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 251
(2016) (“[T]he corporate age has left us with many problems. These include the problem of
responsibility—of how to hold one another accountable for harms and wrongs—when they’re committed
within, and seriously enabled by, large nonhuman institutions that are designed to limit responsibility.
The contemporary pattern of corporate crime prosecutions is evidence for the responsibility deficit, not
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Once again, scholars working on issues of corporate rights have faced their
own set of calls for drastic reform. As academic and popular dissatisfaction with
the rising tide of corporate rights began to grow, particularly in the wake of
Citizens United, some progressive reformers called for a constitutional
amendment declaring that corporations are not entitled to constitutional rights.81
Such proposals gained wide support, both among grassroots groups and among
prominent public figures. For example, Occupy Wall Street made elimination of
all corporate constitutional rights a centerpiece of its populist movement.82 And
wholesale elimination of corporate constitutional rights captured the attention
and support of several candidates during the 2016 presidential campaign, as well
as more than a dozen states and over two hundred members of Congress.83
In response, realists about corporate rights have worked to deflate these
drastic reforms, calling instead for a more focused inquiry into the practical costs
and benefits of particular constitutional rights.84 To be sure, this inquiry would
not seek to deny the real social harms caused by the recent extension of corporate
rights. Indeed, realists about corporate rights have offered serious and sustained
critiques of the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby.85 For

its cure.”); David Ciepley, Can Corporations Be Held to the Public Interest, or Even the Law, 154 J. BUS.
ETHICS 1003, 1013–16 (2019) (arguing that to prevent corporate crime, we need to make some
fundamental changes to the structure of the modern corporation); STEVE TOMBS & DAVID WHYTE, THE
CORPORATE CRIMINAL: WHY CORPORATIONS MUST BE ABOLISHED 173 (2015) (“[T]he key task must
be to attack the legal basis upon which corporate power and irresponsibility is constituted—legal
personhood, from which follows so many of the features of the corporate form.”); see also Grietje Baars,
“It’s Not Me, It’s the Corporation”: The Value of Corporate Accountability in the Global Political
Economy, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 127, 127 (2016) (“[S]ometimes the challenge extends beyond the
individual corporation to the concept of the corporation per se . . . .”).
81. See, e.g., We the People Amendment, MOVE TO AMEND, https://www.movetoamend.org/
amendment [https://perma.cc/D4RL-AERL] (proposing a constitutional amendment stating, “We, the
People of the United States of America, reject the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling and other
related cases, and move to amend our Constitution to firmly establish that money is not speech, and that
human beings, not corporations, are persons entitled to constitutional rights”); The Democracy
Amendments, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, https://freespeechforpeople.org/democracy-amendments/
[https://perma.cc/Y3S4-HU5T] (expressing support for The People’s Rights Amendment, S. 736, 116th
Cong. (2019), which declares, in relevant part, that “The words people, person, or citizen as used in [the
U.S.] Constitution do not include corporations, limited liability companies or other corporate entities . .
. .”).
82. See WINKLER, supra note 79, at 374–76 (describing an Occupy Wall Street resolution proposing
that “human beings, not corporations, are persons entitled to constitutional rights, and that the rights of
human beings will never again be granted to fictitious entities or property”).
83. See KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE
IT) 7 (2018).
84. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 10, at 1663. For extended criticism of proposals to amend the
constitution to eliminate corporate personhood, see GREENFIELD, supra note 83, at 6–26; Kent
Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309 (2015). For an argument that
logic must be “relative to consequences rather than to antecedents,” see Dewey, Logical Method, supra
note 64, at 26.
85. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2016)
[hereinafter Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law]; Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and
Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149 (Micah Schwartzman,
Chad Flanders & Zoe Robinson, eds., 2016); Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 10.
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example, a number of scholars have shown in great detail how the Citizens United
Court’s casual assumptions about “the procedures of corporate democracy” were
radically out of touch with the actual facts on the ground in modern
corporations.86 And others have shown that the Hobby Lobby Court made
unwarranted—and indeed outright false—assumptions about the impact of
corporate religious exemptions on the interests of employees.87
But while recognizing the serious costs of their expansion, realists about
corporate rights have remained sensitive to their benefits.88 Chief among those
benefits is the corporation’s right to own property in its own name, separate and
distinct from the property owned by individual shareholders.89 If corporations
were to be stripped of property rights, as some reformers appear to prefer, then
we would lose much of what makes the corporate form such an efficient structure
for large-scale economic projects. Whatever one thinks about the costs of
corporate free speech and religious liberty rights, any sober analysis would need
to consider the downsides accompanying wholesale revocation of corporate
rights.
In the remainder of this Part, I suggest that those who propose to reform the
corporate structure in the name of reducing corporate crime should remain
similarly attentive to the corporation’s benefits. To be clear, I do not mean to
suggest that reformers are wrong about the ways in which the corporate structure
contributes to corporate crime. Indeed, much as it seems plain that there are
serious costs that have come with the expansion of corporate rights to free speech
and religious liberty, there are also real costs of maintaining a legal form that has
been the incubator of so much criminal behavior. Instead, I wish to make the
more modest point that promoting social wealth through an efficient corporate
governance system is also part of our political morality, and that we ought to have
a more fulsome account of the corporate structure’s core benefits before we go
down the path of drastic reform.90
Take, for example, the provocative proposal that we abolish the corporate
form.91 The motivation behind this proposal seems to be the sense that the very
idea of the corporation as a separate entity is misbegotten. We have erected new
legal beings, on this account, capable of amassing huge resources and deploying
them in their own interests. But by breathing life into these new beings, it is said

86. See, e.g., Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, supra note 85; Bebchuk & Jackson,
Shining Light, supra note 43.
87. See Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby’s Bitter
Anniversary, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2015), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/hobby-lobbys-bitteranniversary.html [https://perma.cc/5A52-FKWJ] (disputing the Hobby Lobby Court’s claim that thirdparty costs of a corporate religious exemption would be “precisely zero”).
88. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 10, at 1663.
89. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
90. For an account of corporate separation’s moral benefits, see James D. Nelson, The Morality of
Corporate Separation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
91. See TOMBS & WHYTE, supra note 80.
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that we have created monsters that we are no longer able to control. The tweaks
and refinements we have tried over the years, including those in the criminal law,
cannot save us from these monsters. We need to pull the plug on our own
creations.92
To carry the day, however, this reform proposal would need to contend with
the “essential” contributions of corporate separateness to modern economic
life.93 The most important feature of the corporate form is that it creates a distinct
pool of assets that is owned by the firm itself and separates those assets from
shareholders’ personal property.94 Corporate separateness, in turn, carries
considerable economic benefits. To begin with, it allows firms to use their own
assets to bond contracts—that is, firms can pledge their own assets to business
creditors in assurance that they will satisfy their obligations.95 In doing so, it
subordinates the claims of shareholders’ personal creditors, which means that
business creditors need not concern themselves with the personal finances of a
numerous—and constantly shifting—group of equity investors.96 To properly
assess the terms on which to extend credit, a creditor can instead rely on
information about the assets owned by the business itself. Creditors are likely to
find it much cheaper to monitor these assets, given that they will be more clearly
delineated and they will be more familiar to creditors. Lowering the cost of
creditor monitoring, in turn, will allow firms to obtain credit on more favorable
terms and expand their ability to pursue socially valuable projects.97
A second economic benefit of corporate separateness is that it prevents
shareholders—or their personal creditors—from prematurely liquidating firm
assets.98 In the typical case, the value of a firm is greater as an ongoing business
than it would be if all its assets were liquidated. But this “going concern” value
would be in danger if shareholders or their personal creditors had the power to
suck money out of the firm at will. Such power would not only destroy firm value
in instances where shareholders actually exercise liquidation authority, but also
in cases where shareholders leverage the mere threat of liquidation to extract
private benefits. By blocking this threat of liquidation, corporate separateness
makes it much more difficult for investors or their creditors to engage in such
value-destroying practices.99

92. See, e.g., id.; see also MARY W. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS
(1818). For a recent critique of corporate demonization, see William S. Laufer & Matthew Caulfield,
Wall Street and Progressivism, 37 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 36 (2020).
93. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 89 (providing the leading account).
94. This form of separateness is particularly important, given that it could not feasibly be
accomplished by contractual means alone. See id.
95. See id. at 392.
96. See id.
97. See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1343–50 (2006).
98. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 89, at 402.
99. See id. at 403; Hansmann et al., supra note 97, at 1348; see also Margaret M. Blair, Locking in
Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L.
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Finally, when a firm owns its own assets and can use those assets to bond
contracts with firm creditors, shareholders do not have to concern themselves
with the personal finances of other shareholders.100 That is, the terms that a
business is able to obtain from its creditors are determined by the assets owned
by the firm itself, and they do not turn on the personal finances of individual
investors.101 If things were otherwise, a firm’s cost of capital would depend on the
creditworthiness of individual investors, and those investors would then need to
monitor each other so that personal finances do not infect the firm’s own financial
position. Such monitoring costs—multiplied over each firm in which a
shareholder invests—would make it more expensive for shareholders to diversify
their investments. And it would also impair the tradability of corporate shares,
given that transfers among differently situated investors would affect the value
of the firm itself.102
This rehearsal of economic benefits is not meant to be dispositive on
questions of corporate reform. Instead, the point of detailing some of the
corporate form’s attractive economic features is to urge a full accounting of both
the costs and the benefits of the corporate structure. The realists’ plea here, in
turn, is not that we come to any particular conclusion about how these costs and
benefits stack up against each other. It is simply that the benefits of corporate
separateness must be considered alongside its costs when contemplating drastic
corporate reforms. To return to the theme of this Article, in other words, the
“facts and relations” that we care about when it comes to thinking through how
the law should treat corporations include the many ways in which the corporate
form promotes economic efficiency and social wealth.
VI
CONCLUSION
There are some striking parallels between the resurgence of debates about
the nature of corporations among corporate rights scholars and renewed interest
in similar questions within criminal law. In the wake of Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby, questions of corporate personhood took center stage in
conversations about what kinds of rights corporations should be able to claim.
Following the methodology recommended by John Dewey in the early twentieth
century, a small group of scholars revived the realist approach to problems of
corporate rights. Realists about corporate rights have emphasized the
indeterminacy of theories of corporate personality. They have recommended an
empirically informed, social scientific approach to understanding how

REV. 387 (2003) (arguing that the ability to lock in capital in the corporate form contributed to the rise
of the business corporation in the Nineteenth Century).
100. See Hansmann et al., supra note 97, at 1348–50.
101. See id. at 1350. But see Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small
Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2368 (2005) (finding that small-business owners had
personally guaranteed the corporation’s debt in 56% of bankruptcy cases in their data set).
102. See Hansmann et al., supra note 97, at 1350.

05 - NELSON - SOME REALISM ABOUT CORPORATE CRIME (DO NOT DELETE)

132

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/14/2021 12:39 PM

[Vol. 83:113

corporations actually function. At the same time, they have documented a long
history of businesses coopting discourses of corporate responsibility and using
them to augment corporate power. And finally, they have urged that efforts at
legal reform should pay close attention to the benefits that corporations provide
as well as the costs they impose.
This Article has suggested that realist arguments about corporate rights, in
one way or another, can be fruitfully leveraged by those studying parallel
developments in corporate criminal law. Just as conversations about corporate
rights have gained clarity and focus from realist insights, so too might
conversations in criminal law benefit from some realism about corporate crime.

